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"TREATY PRINCIPLES": 
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS INSIDE 
A CONSERVATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
PG McHugh* 
This article looks at the impact and afterlife of the groundbreaking Maori Council judgments 
handed down in the late 1980s by the Court of Appeal presided by the late Sir Robin Cooke (as he 
then was). This article refutes any notion of constitutional relations with Māori being founded on 
race despite unilateral (and long discarded) legal design tending towards that characterisation. The 
true pattern has been iwi-based and it has arisen from the continuity of whakapapa in the 
organization of Maori political life and relations with the state notwithstanding meddlesome but 
ultimately ineffectual legislative attempts to dilute tribalism. Over the past twenty plus years, the 
Treaty claims processes initiated in 1985 have accentuated and revitalised that tribalism. Far from 
licensing judicial interventionism "Treaty principles" are part of an embedded and conservative 
jurisprudence of Māori affairs. Their elimination from legislation would amputate a major segment 
of that jurisprudence. The courts, whose profile in this broad field (Treaty claims processes most 
notably) is mostly a resiling one, would respond by generating their own version. The legacy of Sir 
Robin Cooke’s court is deep-rooted and thoroughly integrated into the New Zealand legal system. 
In early September 2006, as I was preparing the earliest version of this paper for a public lecture 
at Victoria University of Wellington, there came the sad news of the death of Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon. For me Robin's personal support was considerable, particularly when I was a young 
scholar then junior academic at Cambridge University1 during the 1980s working in what was then 
the uncharted territory of common-law aboriginal rights. I opened my lecture with a tribute to him 
as a jurist, scholar and friend and have since revised this text to emphasise more closely our 
personal connection, which was especially strong during the key period when he was adjudicating 
upon important issues surrounding Māori claims.  
  
*  Reader in Law at the University of Cambridge and Ashley McHugh Ngai Tahu Professor of Law at Victoria 
University of Wellington 
1  This is a debt I have recorded elsewhere, see "Aboriginal Title in New Zealand: A Retrospect and Prospect" 
(2004) 2 NZJPIL 139. 
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In the early 1980s the field of aboriginal rights was still primarily an academic endeavour in 
which a small group of common law scholars, mostly Canadian, exhorted national courts to embark 
upon the process of articulating a set of rights, especially in relation to customary property. As it 
was, Robin never sat on a court that adjudicated directly in this field although he and the bench of 
the Court of Appeal over which he presided issued highly sympathetic dicta. Once, long after the 
chance had disappeared, he confessed to me privately his disappointment that the Crown had not 
appealed Williamson J's judgment in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer.2 One sensed he wanted 
to strengthen this first and first-instance recognition of common law aboriginal title by a New 
Zealand court. One sensed also, although Robin – always the embodiment of judicial propriety 
towards the executive branch – never commented directly to me on this point, that the Government 
had not wanted to give his Court that opportunity. Nonetheless he grasped the underlying concern of 
that early-1980s aboriginal-rights scholarship. Essentially, it was an argument for correction of what 
was a surviving historical feature of the Anglo-settler jurisdictions of Canada and Australasia, 
namely the omission of tribal peoples from the juridical compass of common-law constitutionalism. 
The admission of tribal peoples into that legitimating rights-place was a process, the scholarship 
argued, where the initial onus was on the courts. The governing principle of non-justiciability had 
for decades given politicians a free hand in the state's management of relations with tribal peoples, 
so the political branch had no interest in sponsoring revision of the legal position. It was for the 
courts to act, to legitimise the position of tribal peoples at a time when increasing militancy 
threatened taking it in another direction. This was the thrust of the scholarship: Even at that stage it 
had the inherently conservative design of incorporating tribes into mainstream legalism.3 
During the late 1980s, the New Zealand Court of Appeal addressed that history in the 
remarkable sequence of Maori Council cases presided over by Sir Robin (as he then was). These 
were cases that shifted the constitutional tectonic plates irreversibly, making impossible a return to 
the old pattern of juridical exclusion. The core notion was one of admitting the justiciability of the 
relationship between the Crown and Māori. That was a form of legal revisionism accepted as 
  
2  Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 682 (HC). 
3  In the New Zealand context the conservative aspect of common-law aboriginal rights argumentation was 
recognised and criticised by radical academic commentators such as Moana Jackson, DV Williams and Jane 
Kelsey. See RA Sharp Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New 
Zealand since the 1970s (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) and Paul Havemann "The Pakeha 
Constitutional Revolution: Five Perspectives on Maori Rights and Pakeha Duties" (1993) 1 Waikato LR 53 
for a history and analysis of this scholarship. Equally, conservative commentators (practitioners mostly, 
such as EJ Haughey and G Chapman, of a markedly un-academic character) criticised the "creativity" of this 
scholarship. Certainly when the key judgments issued in the four key common-law jurisdictions of Canada 
(1973), United States (1978), New Zealand (1987-91) and Australia (1992) accusations of "judicial 
activism" were rife, particularly by members of the political branch. There is no doubt but that admission to 
the rights-discourse, by which aboriginal groups have been encircled in the past twenty years, was initiated 
by the courts: see PG McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status 
and Self-Determination (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). 
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commonplace now, and a step that retrospect shows as eventually carrying an inherent 
conservatism, a quality on which I comment more fully below. Further, in the late 1980s the step 
was consistent with the widening reach of public law at large, a trend suggesting that it would have 
been more remarkable had the Court of Appeal not brought Māori into the rights-place. Nonetheless 
at the time the Maori Council cases were seen, rightly, as a breathtaking and paradigm-changing 
leap from which there could be no turning back. All the obituarists have rightly noted Robin's 
leadership in that important step, seeing it as one of his greatest, if not his greatest, contribution to 
New Zealand jurisprudence and politics in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Historical 
contextualisation does not diminish so much as underline its significance. 
This article is concerned with that constitutional space and the shape that it has taken in the 
twenty years since the Maori Council cases. In my September 2006 address, I looked at that modern 
history of Māori constitutional presence in the light of the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
Deletion Bill then before Parliament.4 It was known then that this Bill had no legs and would not 
even have made it onto the floor of the House were it not for the coalition agreement. By the time 
this article is published it will have become a very minor and passing footnote in the history of the 
Treaty jurisprudence. However, even as a fleeting minnow, the Bill raised questions about the way 
in which the New Zealand constitutional system has accommodated Māori in the past twenty years, 
in particular their claims associated with the Treaty of Waitangi. The death of Robin gave another 
more poignant reason to review that history, especially in the light of the agenda-setting contribution 
of his Court of Appeal in the sequence of Maori Council cases (1987-91).5 In these cases the Court 
endorsed the Waitangi Tribunal's articulation of the range of "Treaty principles" as set out in key 
statutory regimes, particularly those establishing the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear historical claims 
(1985) and the corporatising of state assets (1986). It is this process of judicial interpretation and 
application of Treaty principles that the 2006 Bill sought to abort. Other events before and after 
those of mid-2006 have also motivated this article, in particular the Orewa speech in February 2004 
of Don Brash, as Leader of the Opposition. This cynical speech was a worrying and incendiary mis-
characterisation of the constitutional position of Maori as being based on "race".  
  
4  This Member's Bill was introduced by R Doug Woolerton MP, New Zealand First on 29 June 2006. The 
Bill failed its second reading on 7 November 2007 by a vote of 112 to 7. 
5  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA); Tainui Maori Trust Board v 
Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA); Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General [1990] 2 
NZLR 641. In his Harkness Henry Lecture "The Challenge of Treaty of Waitangi Jurisprudence" (Hamilton, 
1994), Sir Robin noted (at note 27): 
The first Muriwhenua judgment also led to an exchange rather out of the ordinary. In her Waitangi 
Day speech in 1990 Her Majesty the Queen had quoted some words from the first Maori Council case 
about partnership and the utmost good faith. She built on these words in a way referred to in the 
Muriwhenua judgment [ibid, 655], and there was some consequent correspondence. 
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To my mind those events necessitate refreshment of our awareness of the modern and complex 
jurisprudence of Māori affairs in the rights era launched by Sir Robin Cooke's Court. What is the 
juridical foundation of the Māori jurisprudence, and how and where has that been articulated inside 
New Zealand's constitutional sphere in the years since the Maori Council cases? That legalism of 
the past twenty years will be termed the "Māori jurisprudence", meaning the body of law and 
practice inside the constitutional system of New Zealand that affects Māori affairs and that in 
various ways incorporates elements of tikanga Māori into that system. It will be argued that "Treaty 
principles" form a part of that wider jurisprudence, an important one to be sure, but they are far from 
its entirety. It will be further argued that since the foundational Maori Council cases, that 
jurisprudence has developed in a cautious and conservative manner. Repealing "Treaty principles" 
from the various statutory regimes would create a legal vacuum inviting the judicial "activism"6 the 
2006 Bill holds in scorn. 
The explanatory note declared that the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill 2006 
(Treaty Principles Deletion Bill) sought "to correct an anomaly that has harmed race relations in 
New Zealand since 1986 when the vague term 'the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi' was 
included in legislation."7 Māori, the note insisted, had not sought the legislation (a protestation that 
seems to indicate forgetfulness of the Waitangi Tribunal's role in securing the belated inclusion of 
what became section 9 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986).8 Rather, it had been inserted by 
the "paternalistic and interfering Ministers" of the Fourth Labour Government. That vagueness, the 
note further complained, had been aggravated by the interpretation of the phrase in the courts. They 
had taken "an increasingly activist, liberal and broad licence" in the interpretation of it and, yet, 
"despite nearly two decades of existence, these principles remain largely undefined and ambiguous." 
This vagueness, the note continued, had benefited the legal profession but there had been "no 
tangible benefit for Maori". Rather it diverted money from them and also it had "surreptitiously 
created unrealistic expectations among Maori in relation to their entitlements from society." Treaty 
principles "allowed some Maori to portray themselves as victims constantly in grievance mode" and 
they had become "a divisive mechanism which has set one group of New Zealanders against one 
another." The note ends by suggesting that Treaty principles were taking New Zealand "down a 
destructive path of separate development" towards the apartheid associated with South Africa, a 
  
6  This is a term often used by my legal colleagues, academic and professional, invariably in a negative sense 
to criticise a style of judgment they regard as too overtly manipulative, and contrived towards engineering 
legal change beyond the reasonable compass of the case law. It is a term with which I have great personal 
discomfort and one that Sir Robin in conversation with me once dismissed as meaningless. 
7  Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill 2006, no 66-1 (Explanatory Note). 
8  Sir Robin Cooke made this point in his Harkness Henry lecture), above n 5, text accompanying note 16: 
"Section 9 was inserted in the legislation in response to representations made to the government by the 
Tribunal and Maori leaders." 
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country "the world watched with horror." This, the note implied chillingly, was where the history of 
race-based treatment would lead us. 
Strong and fearful stuff, but look at its suppositions a little more closely. The explanatory note 
spoke of "Maori" and "society" and damage to this country's race relations through the increasingly 
activist application of Treaty principles by the courts. One looks then to the Treaty of Waitangi and 
finds that it is not a treaty between "Maori" and "society" but between certain representatives – 
chiefs – of political formations described as tribes9 and Her Majesty Queen Victoria (though not, 
interestingly, "her heirs and successors"). The Bill's explanatory note treated Māori monolithically 
as a race, a single all-encompassing racial entity, yet where is the treaty with the Māori "race"? 
Dealing with people on the basis of race is divisive, the note protested, but one sees nothing in the 
Treaty insisting that Maori be given preferential treatment as a race. It must, then, be said at the 
outset and emphatically: race has nothing to do with the Treaty of Waitangi or the principles 
accredited to it. Why, one asks, does an MP or any politician want to characterise as an issue of race 
a constitutional document that does not purport to be founded on that basis? Nicky Hager's recent 
book The Hollow Men10 gives a worrying answer: it panders to the white electorate's racism and 
prejudice, securing electoral gain for those who play the "race card".  
We are rightly wary of those who play the "race card" but rarely embark upon a deeper enquiry 
into why it is so objectionable. The first part of this article is an examination from the legal and 
constitutional perspective. I want to issue a reminder why, from that perspective, Māori claims 
under the Treaty of Waitangi are not a matter of race. And I want to do this by looking closer at this 
notion of race as the juridical means of situating the Māori jurisprudence. The explanatory note 
forebodingly reminded us where the history of race-based treatment could lead. Well, indeed; but it 
seems the author of the Bill needed a pointed reminder more than the public he patronised so self-
righteously (and pompously). The second part of this lecture will look at the role of Treaty 
principles inside the broader more complex Māori jurisprudence, for they are far from forming the 
whole or even the juridical axis of that jurisprudence. That jurisprudence and the Treaty principles 
sector of it I will characterise as deeply conservative and embedded inside the public sphere, and 
mostly as lying well below the public sightline. I argue that the removal of the Treaty principles 
segment of that complex legalism would produce a vacuum that the courts would feel obliged to 
replace. Treaty principles have not been generating an increasing judicial activism, as the Bill's note 
  
9  The actual phrase in the English version is "The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New 
Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation". I 
am using the term compendiously to include iwi and hapū. I am aware of the intense debate about the 
relation of these inside Māori culture, and the histories of that relation (which are highly regionalised); 
however for present purposes I use the term "tribe" to embrace both organic whakapapa (genealogically 
associated) forms of customary political organisation. 
10  Nicky Hager The Hollow Men: A Study in the Politics of Deception (Craig Potton Publishing, Nelson, 2006) 
79, 89. 
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claims, but rather they have allowed courts to take what is presently a resiling profile. The dramatic 
exception to that – the Court of Appeal judgments in the foreshore and seabed case – was, of course, 
not a Treaty principles case but rested on common law principles, that is to say matters of statutory 
interpretation and aboriginal title to which the Treaty was at most peripheral.  
In short, this article argues that Treaty principles are not about "race" (the catch-cry of the 
mischievous and constitutionally uninformed). Anyway, those principles are only a portion of the 
Māori jurisprudence. They represent a deeply conservative portion the removal of which would 
excite rather than extirpate judicial "activism". 
I "IT'S NOT ABOUT RACE": THE RISE OF RACIALISED THOUGHT AND 
ITS ABSORPTION INTO ANGLO-SETTLER LEGALISM 
Before the nineteenth century the diversity of human societies was not founded in a notion of 
race such as developed from that time. Until the early nineteenth century mankind was seen as one 
large family and by this monogenic view the differences from society to society were seen as 
grounded in environment, education and divine order. One can see this in the usual manner of 
reference to Indian tribes on the American continent throughout the seventeenth and eighteen 
centuries. Most usually they were "savage" and "barbarous", defined by the perception of their 
qualities rather than by the colour of their skin. However in the early nineteenth century some came 
to see mankind as composed of many families or species, this being known as polygenism. 
Although the debate between the two approaches was made obsolete by the rise of Darwinism, the 
emergence of a discourse counter to the established one of monogenism contributed to the 
establishment, institutionalisation, and authority of science. It has been said that polygenism 
ultimately served three interconnected functions that made it attractive to those who deployed it and 
which made it an extension of the Enlightenment project. First it repudiated the biblical chronology 
of Creation. Although that had been the subject of long dispute, the polygenetic theorists based their 
critique upon the evidence from anthropology, philology, and archaeology. The discrediting of the 
biblical chronology both contributed to, and resulted from, a second aspect of the polygenic theory: 
the emphasis upon the principle of "free inquiry" and the divorce of religious from 
scientific/philosophical knowledge. However, that "free inquiry" did not just involve the essentially 
secular pursuit or production of knowledge for its own sake. Its third aspect lay in accentuating how 
scientific knowledge had come into being with the Enlightenment in order to "better" the individual 
and society. Scientific knowledge was to be a bio-social discursive formation that could be widely 
deployed to analyse and resolve even the most intractable social problems.11  
  
11  This paragraph's account of these three aspects of polygenism is taken from Ricardo Brown "Human 
Variety, the Species Question, and the Origins of Race" (Paper to the Science and Race in 19th Century 
America Panel, American Studies Association Annual Meeting, 11 November 2004).  
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That scientificism had, of course, a legal form in late-nineteenth century legal positivism and the 
industrialisation of law in the profession and professoriate. Not only did law become a forensic 
science in which the command located in statute or case was clinically extracted by trained 
practitioners, but that process became the closed shop of that clerisy by way of an organised and 
disciplined profession and formal classroom instruction in the universities. And in the secularising 
world it generated the attendant belief (one that still endures in legal thought long after positivism's 
grip has weakened) that law could be used instrumentally to effect social change. Law became a 
manifestation of an inherently dynamic and purposive (as well as purely) human agency.12 
Legal positivism was far from the only (and belated at that) intellectual product of nineteenth 
century scientificism. Mid-century there also emerged the notion of "scientific racialism". Historians 
of thought have tended rather simplistically to depict that emergent discursive practice as entailing a 
change from environmental to biological determinism,13 but the point is that it encouraged an 
approach towards cultural difference that enabled it to be characterised primarily by physical 
appearance. There was, so to speak, a biologising of difference. Arthur de Gobineau's An Essay on 
the Inequality of the Human Races (1853) is often regarded as one of the earliest and most 
influential examples of the new scientific racialism. Gobineau saw the decay of race and the mixing 
of blood (miscegenation) as the cause of the fall of civilisations. He distinguished between the 
white, the black, and the yellow in terms of the relative limitations of reason, thought, and intellect 
in non-white races and the predominance of energy, desire, and intensity, combined paradoxically 
with passivity, to be found in the black and yellow races.14  
But this was not simply the discourse of intellectuals. Enough of that emergent ideology of race 
passed into the muddy mainstream of popular thought where its secularising tendency was diluted 
and where it shored up Anglo-American expansionism. In America, scientific racialism, in its 
corrupt populist form, helped to nourish the notion of Manifest Destiny (the term first used in 1845 
to describe the rightful destiny of the United States to extend across the continent).15 The emergent 
idea of race as a biological difference helped justify the forced removal of the Cherokee west of the 
Mississippi River (1832) and the continuance of the institution of slavery in the antebellum 
  
12  Roger Cotterell The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Butterworths, 
London, 1989) 80. 
13  See Bruce Dain "Was There a Transition to Modern Racism in the Ante-bellum Era?" (Paper to the Science 
and Race in 19th Century America Panel, American Studies Association Annual Meeting, 11 November 
2004). See also Mark Francis “The "Civilizing" of Indigenous People in Nineteenth-Century Canada” 
(1998) 9 Journal of World History 51.  
14  Zohreh T Sullivan "Race, Gender and Imperial Ideology in the Nineteenth Century" (1989) 19 Nineteenth-
Century Contexts 19. 
15  "[I]t would be the systematic body of concepts and beliefs that powered American life and American 
culture." Michael T Lubragge Manifest Destiny (Department of Alfa-informatica, University of Groningen, 
Groningen, 1997). 
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American republic. Racialism was linked to American expansionism, both physically in the drive 
westward and economically on the sweaty, whipped brow of slavery. Even though the abolitionists 
on both sides of the Atlantic prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century there had been implanted into 
popular consciousness a sense of other societies as inherently different, rather than as being 
ultimately similar (if, perhaps, unbelieving). The notion of race received an extra boost from the 
percolation into populist discourse of elements of social Darwinism, derived from the work of 
Herbert Spencer. In Britain this process gained momentum from two key events – the Sepoy 
Rebellion (Indian Mutiny) of 1857 and the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865.16 Race and empire, two 
highly fluid and elusive notions and the more readily put into circulation because of that, slippery 
grip on popular excitability seemed bound together (for all the anti-imperialism of Spencer himself). 
At this stage it has been argued the British notion of empire acquired a global character, as a kind of 
mission to bring and ensure global order and the ascendancy of western civilisation.17 Spencer's 
thought was corrupted into a debased and highly vulgarised popular form depicting cultures as 
locked unavoidably in competition in which the fittest would survive and flourish. Of course, the 
evident superiority of the Anglo-European culture (from whence that conceptualising derived) 
meant that its ascendancy was the outcome of those natural forces of social evolution. The best fate 
for subject races, indigenous peoples included, was for them to assimilate into the society of the 
superior European race.  
By the late-nineteenth century the notion of race had truly arrived and passed messily into the 
mainstream. It was, one must stress, a way of seeing and classifying the world that had its origins in 
nineteenth-century scientificism as absorbed into and mulched by the jumble of other strains of 
thought that swirled about popular Anglo-American culture of the time. Race has never been the 
discourse of indigenous peoples. It was and remains an entirely western mode of classifying the 
Other (hence the arrogance implicit in the Treaty Principles Deletion Bill 2006). And for indigenous 
peoples there were important consequences stemming from the dominance it had in the white mind's 
monolithic conceptualisation of them: race allowed the white settler-state to be self-righteously 
expansionist (meaning it justified their acquisitive attitude towards tribal land). Since race was 
biological and essentialist, interbreeding was frowned upon and its progeny, the mixed blood or 
"half-castes" as they were called, became regarded as problematic and a distinct juridical being. 
Race was assimilationist – it demanded that the non-European (male) citizen should be bleached 
into a property-owning individual each solely responsible for their own secular salvation. It was also 
reductionist, allowing settler authorities to shun and deliberately undermine the messy realities of 
  
16  See Karuna Marena "The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism" in Duncan Bell (ed) Victorian Vision of Global 
Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007) 113-135. 
17  Duncan Bell "Victorian Visions of Global Order: An Introduction" in ibid, 1-25. 
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tribal political organisation by subsuming the tribes en masse into the much easier sweeping 
category of race. 
And as Anglo-American thought had also reached a view of its law as instrumental – that is to 
say, law as an instrument for social and cultural change – the settler-state put in place laws that 
reflected those consequences of its own racialising vision of tribal peoples. By the late-nineteenth 
century the settler-states of North America and Australasia were actively constructing legal regimes 
for aboriginal peoples founded upon the racial paradigm their own thought had devised. Laws were 
used aggressively to acquire the tribes' land by purchase, cession, confiscation or individualisation 
(the expansionist consequence). Law determined who was indigenous or not based on the scientific 
measure of blood percentage (the biological and essentialist). Mixed-blood people, many ethnically 
identifying as aboriginal, were cordoned into a special twilight category, often leaving them neither 
legally aboriginal nor a full white citizen. Law set in place mechanisms for the transformation of the 
tribal individual into the secular redemption of enfranchised property-owning citizenship (the 
assimilationist). Native affairs were treated by the Anglo-settler state as a matter of race, not a series 
of relations and engagements with various tribal polities (the reductionist). The web of laws passed 
by settler-states of North America and Australasia thus saw tribalism not as a political manifestation 
of group coherence, but as a racial attribute or biological propensity of the individual and out of 
which each tribe member had to be coaxed, coached or perhaps even coerced (as in the residential 
schools policies of Canada and Australia). 
Those legal manifestations of the consequences of racialised thought emerged at a time when 
the physical suppression of the tribes was well in train in the Great Land Rush of the late-nineteenth 
century. The Plains Wars, Maori Wars and Métis Rebellion in the second half of the nineteenth 
century established not only the military ascendancy of the settler-state but licensed its own race-
based intellectualisation of that hard-won superiority. If before that time tribes had been seen as 
distinct political formations each meriting distinct and particular treatment informed by their history 
of relations with the white government, by the end of that century it was tribalism that was seen as 
the undesirable attribute. Tribalism rather than tribes had become the issue. By re-conceiving the 
tribes in a racial manner, the "native problem" could be dealt with on a monolithic basis overlooking 
the peculiarities of particular groups. In America, for example, that re-conceptualisation allowed a 
mixture of culturally wide-apart peoples to be removed and crammed together onto reservations, 
often (as with the Five Civilized Tribes of present-day Oklahoma and the influx onto their land of 
black freedmen after the Civil War), where they were left to resolve their incompatibilities. In 
Canada First Nations were dispersed into statutory bands under the federal Indian Act 1876 where 
race – Indian status under the Act – rather than nationhood defined their being. At least as initially 
imposed on First Nations, the "band" was a unit of administrative convenience, not a natural 
political grouping. In Australia the series of aborigines' protection laws passed by each colony and 
(after federation) state were founded entirely on a racial basis. In these common-law jurisdictions 
race was literally the governing paradigm. 
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Race provided a tidy monolithic way of seeing the tribal societies, a totalising way that 
dispensed with the messy plurality of tribal nations. For white law-makers it addressed the barrier to 
the aboriginal individual's advancement towards civilisation arising from the attribute of tribalism. 
Reservations were established in the United States and Canada overseen by government pharaohs 
with total control, in the former by the government's arrogation of power from the tribes themselves 
(and later under the boilerplate constitutions of the Indian Reorganization Act 1934) and in the latter 
under the federal Indian Act 1876. In these jurisdictions laws of status were applied and registers of 
membership kept by bureaucrats, many of those in the United States using blood percentages, to 
determine who was or was not legally an aboriginal. In Australia protectors were appointed with 
intrusive and far-reaching authority over those Aborigines hapless enough to come under their reach 
(although many, wisely, stayed away).  
New Zealand also moved towards race-based law-making, as embodied in the official policy of 
assimilation. The native land legislation was justified by the policy of transforming the tribal 
member into a property-owning individual outside the sphere of the customary. Individualisation of 
customary title had de-tribalisation as its philosophical goal (even if access to Maori land was its 
more pragmatic and pressing design). 
As a way of perceiving tribal societies and informing the character of laws passed to manage 
their affairs and assets, the notion of race has, therefore, had a dramatic impact upon them. Yet, it 
must be stressed that this was not an aboriginal way of seeing the world but a form of monolithic 
classification that enabled Anglo-American settler polities to construct their own simplified (and 
simplistic) view of the tribal. Inside those laws the tribal polities continued and adapted: simply 
because the law of Leviathan sought to dissolve the tribes or replace them with temporary, 
transitional and westernised vehicles of collective action did not mean that a bleaching result 
occurred. And certainly aboriginal cultures absorbed some of the race-based legalism surrounding 
them.18 They had considerable agency inside those legal frameworks, such as (in New Zealand) in 
their dealings with the Native Land Court. Tribes were not passive in their experience and 
management of race-based legalism.19 In all jurisdictions each group has had a history of adaptation 
  
18  One notable North American example was the adoption by Plains tribal nations of rules excluding from 
tribal membership (and hence access to tribal land) female band members marrying non-Indians. This rule 
appeared in the late nineteenth century as the Plains wars were depleting young Indian males and white 
settlers were taking Indian wives in order to obtain land. Often these white husbands wanted to partition 
their land off from the tribe and were highly resistant to tribal authority. In the late-twentieth century Indian 
females argued that this loss of status was discriminatory, especially when the marriage had broken down 
and they were self-identifying tribe members. The authority of the Native American tribe to make this 
membership rule was upheld by the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez (1978) 436 US 49 
however, Canada, prompted by the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, eventually took the 
opposite position: see McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law, above n 3, 248-50. 
19  This dynamic interplay of Pākehā legalism and Māori custom is caught by Richard Boast in his book Buying 
the Land, Selling the Land: Governments and Maori land in the North Island 1865-1921 (Victoria 
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and survival and, indeed, absorption of the racialised way of thinking used to corral and re-colourate 
them. 
Yet, having constructed the discourse of race the same settler-state that had contrived and 
applied it later decided that it would be best to dismantle it, or to put in place mechanisms and laws 
that tried to overlook it. This was substantially the outcome of the Second World War where the 
horrific consequences of state-sponsored racialism were all too plain. In the years after the war, 
Anglo-American jurisdictions decided that the differential treatment of citizens on grounds of race 
could not be tolerated in a liberal democracy. All common-law jurisdictions moved towards the 
dismantling of the remnant laws that had the effect of protecting or maintaining the distinctive status 
of tribal peoples and their land tenure. In America there began the policy of "terminating" federal 
recognition of tribes, a policy of the 1950s and 1960s; Canada tabled an aptly named White Paper 
(in 1969) proposing abolition of Indian status and the dissolution of reservations; in Australia the 
1967 "citizenship" referendum was seen as a step towards a more aggressive nationally-based 
approach to Aboriginal assimilation;20 and in New Zealand the National Government passed the 
controversial Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 which removed a substantial amount of the 
protection of Māori freehold land from alienation. 
At the same time as proposing the removal of special aboriginal status at law, the North 
American and Australasian jurisdictions were developing their municipal norms of non-
discrimination. Yet, by trying to declare the legal irrelevance of race and prohibit it as a ground for 
treatment in the public sphere, the anti-discrimination measures essentially maintained a race-based 
juridical discourse. If anything the United Nations human rights covenants of 1969 encouraged that 
persistence in specifying the rights of national minorities in terms of non-discrimination. To the 
extent then that indigenous peoples were being seen in the 1970s as rights-bearing groups, it 
occurred mostly through those emergent human rights norms and implicitly as the right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of race. Race remained the governing paradigm. Hence, for 
example, one finds the passage of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 in Australia, a crucial 
Commonwealth statute that remains vital in protecting Aboriginal clan nations from marauding state 
legislation (concerning native title especially). Similar civil rights legislation strengthening the non-
discrimination norm in areas such as employment and the provision of public services was also 
passed in the United States and Canada in this period running from the late 1960s through the mid-
  
University Press, Wellington, 2008). I have read the manuscript of this important and fascinating book 
which captures law as a site of contest, adaptation, co-option as well as oppression. This is the first major 
work pioneering and setting the benchmark for a modern tradition of New Zealand legal history, connecting 
events in New Zealand to international scholarship on the impact of legal imperialism (such as the approach 
explained by John Comaroff "Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword" (2001) 26 Law and Social 
Inquiry 305). 
20  McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law, above n 3, 337-340. The 1967 referendum leading to 
the Commonwealth assuming legislative jurisdiction over Aboriginal affairs is discussed more fully below. 
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1970s. In New Zealand the important statutes were the Race Relations Act 1971 and the Human 
Rights Commission Act 1977.  
But for indigenous peoples it can be seen, in retrospect, that the theme of this 1970s legalism, 
though admittedly important, was still only a partial one that did not specifically authorise and 
endorse their indigeneity which retained at its heart their customary political organisation as tribes. 
Race was still the core juridical theme. It was not until the mid-1980s that the international and 
national human rights norms started to reconfigure in a more proactive and sympathetic manner 
organised around the notion of indigeneity and recognition of the tribe.21 
II CROWN RELATIONS WITH MAORI: THE INVISIBLE TRIBE 
I emphasised earlier that the constitutional basis of the Crown's relations with Māori is not and 
has never been founded on race. However the historical account just given shows that from the late-
nineteenth century, when law became a prominent device for the management of aboriginal 
relations, those laws were being everywhere framed in terms of race. But, as I have stressed, those 
terms were not those of the tribal societies themselves, nor the conceptualisation made in the 
terminology of the Treaty of Waitangi, but the projection of a settler-state discourse of cultural 
difference and domination. One might ask when or how did the common-law systems – specifically, 
New Zealand – move out of a racially-oriented view of aboriginal relations to a tribalised one, more 
in step with the way in which those people viewed themselves?  
As I have stressed the Treaty of Waitangi was not a treaty between a race and a monarch. It was 
a treaty between a group of tribal political formations represented through their customary leaders 
with another formation, an imperial one represented by and through its young Queen. As we know, 
this Treaty represented certain understandings reached between those customary leaders and the 
representatives of the imperial Crown about the basis for their co-habitation on the New Zealand 
islands. The Crown, in exercise of its kawanatanga, established courts and proclaimed the 
paramountcy of its legal system as a means for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Early on and 
indeed ever since, Māori sought to use those courts to vindicate the chiefs' understandings of their 
relations with the Crown. Their recourse to law and the mana of the courts invoked not just the 
arrangement made on the coastal promontory at Waitangi, but the succession of treaties and 
arrangements that followed, many (but not all) of them involving their relinquishment of land to 
facilitate white settlement. These regionalised and localised relations between Crown and tribe 
constitute the other layer of Treaty relations that the claims process has been revealing. As Richard 
  
21  See generally James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004) stressing the impact of the United Nations institutions and human rights instruments from the 
mid-1980s in formulating norms specifically oriented around indigenous peoples. 
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Boast has pointed out in an important article they signify an unexplored multi-textual dimension of 
our constitutional history.22  
However, the courts established by the Crown for all its subjects were notoriously unreceptive to 
claims made by representatives of the tribes. Doubtless that unresponsiveness can be explained in 
terms of the state of legal art of the late-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, particularly the 
difficulties with impleading the Crown, absence of the modern-style representative action, and the 
phantom (that is to say, the non-) personality of the tribe being compounded by the broader 
racialising view of Crown-Māori relations. Still the courts made it plain that they were closed to the 
chiefs as a means of protecting tribal interests, to customary land especially, and for supervising 
their relations with the Crown. Neither the guarantees in the Treaty nor the particular promises in 
the myriad of land and other deals between Crown and chief could be enforced through the courts. 
Judges closed the courtroom door by denying the tribes any inherent status as entities inside the 
legal system to which group rights might attach: English law has always had a stringent and rather 
narrow view of personality, and its kiwi manifestation was in no mood to let an amorphous custom-
based group like a tribe into such a zone. And certainly the Māori tribes held no residual and 
subordinate sovereignty of the type recognised by the American courts. Further, the courts insisted 
that any rights associated with the Treaty of Waitangi or contained in some pact between Crown and 
chief required some positive statutory recognition. Only on that basis and to that extent might tribal 
rights gain recognition inside the legal system. 
Yet, by the time that New Zealand courts took that position authoritatively in Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington23 the reality of New Zealand politics had been and continued thereafter to be a highly 
tribalised one. That is, the Crown had conducted its relations with Maori on the basis of its tribal 
organisation. The Treaty of Waitangi was the most dramatic expression of that pattern of relations 
and has dominated most historical surveys of Crown-tribe relations. Yet even after declaring its own 
sovereignty the Crown continued ex necessitae to deal with Maori as a series of tribal polities that 
were imperia in imperio. Those dealings occurred in numerous ways, the various types being set out 
with great clarity by Richard Boast as what he terms cession agreements, confiscation agreements 
and regional pre-emptive agreements. He regards the last type as particularly important in 
demonstrating how the de facto independence of certain parts of the North Island in the late-
nineteenth century was ended by agreement or treaty.24 Certainly the Crown was dealing with the 
tribes of these regions on a quasi-diplomatic basis that had more to do with international relations 
  
22  Richard Boast "Recognising Multitextualism: Rethinking New Zealand's Legal History" (2006) 37 VUWLR 
547. The first half of this article rises in part to the challenge issued by this excellent article to consider the 
place of these lesser transactions between the Crown and tribes in our constitutional history. 
23  Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur NS 72 (SC). I have followed the advice of Professor DV 
Williams on the correct naming of this case. 
24  Boast "Rethinking Multitextualism", above n 22, 559. 
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than domestic politics. Boast identifies the Fenton Agreement with Te Arawa (25 November 1880); 
the King Country negotiations and Aotea agreement (1883-85) and the agreement between the 
Crown and Tuhoe and other tribal groups of the Urewera (1895).25 The multiplicity of these treaty-
like arrangements means, Boast suggests, that we should speak of the Crown's "treaty partners" 
rather than "Treaty partners".26 Thus whilst New Zealand courts were insisting that there were no 
such things as tribes de jure and legislative policy was being formed on a racialised basis, the 
position de facto was very different. Perhaps the reality of the tribes was so menacing to the settler 
polity that its courts had to devise the comforting legal delusion of invisibility and its legislatures 
the policy of erasure?  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, then, the Pakeha state was framing its conception of 
Maori people both individually and collectively in terms of race. Tribalism was seen not as a viable, 
so much as a passing, form of political practice that would go with the assimilation of the Maori 
individual into the white population. It was a racial attribute each Maori had to be encouraged to 
shed. There was a sense that the Government would continue to work through the tribes, but that 
was in order to weaken and eventually dissolve them. The racial element in New Zealand law-
making crept in during the late-nineteenth century and was certainly in place by the time of the 
Native Land Act 1909. Drafted by Sir John Salmond, the Act gave a definition of "Native" as 
including "a half caste and a person intermediate in blood between half castes and persons of pure 
descent of the Native race."27 The Electoral Act 1956, to give a more recent example to show the 
persistence of racialised treatment, also used blood percentage. It divided Māori into three 
categories distinguished by blood: those more than half Māori who were required to enrol on the 
special Māori electorate roll; those less than half Māori who were to enrol on the general European 
roll; with the intermediate category "half-castes" being able to chose either. Whilst that blood 
percentage approach could not operate in relation to succession to land (where descent applied), it 
was eventually abandoned in other spheres of Māori affairs (such as the electoral) in favour of a 
formula that simply required descent from a Māori person.28  
  
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid, 581. 
27  Native Land Act 1909, s 2. See more fully McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law, above n 3, 
274-6. 
28  The Maori Housing Act 1935 defined a Māori as "a person belonging to the aboriginal race of New Zealand, 
and includes a person descended from a native." Also, for example, The Maori Purposes Fund Act 1934-35, 
s 2; The Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945, s 2; The Maori Soldiers Trust Act 1957, s 2; 
The Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, s 2. The Maori Affairs Act 1953 maintained the 1909 definition. The 
Hunn Report [JK Hunn Report on Department of Maori Affairs: with Statistical Supplement, 24 August 
1960 (Government Printer, Wellington, 1961)] advised retaining the 50 per cent quantum, adding that it 
might be extended in the future to three-quarter castes to limit the government's responsibility to Māori. Te 
Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s 3 and the Electoral Act 1993, s 3 use the simple hypodescent formula. See 
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The wording of legislation that provided a vehicle for collective Māori action remained neutral 
on the tribal element that invariably and necessarily poured into those regimes. Implicitly tribalism 
was seen as a passing condition and the statutory regimes as essentially temporary arrangements 
pending, if not facilitating, that assimilation. Yet the viability that those statutory regimes 
experienced on the ground was a reflection of the intensity of tribal engagement and where that 
happened positively they became vehicles for Māori agency rather than assimilation. They worked 
if Māori wanted them to work, and particular tribes at particular moments in time at that. A well-
known example remains the success of Māori incorporations on the East Coast of the North Island 
amongst Ngāti Porou where the mana of Sir Apirana Ngata was and remains influential. Elsewhere 
the success of the incorporation has been much more chequered. Thus the effectiveness of statutory 
mechanisms was and today is still a function of their ongoing attractiveness (passing or permanent) 
to Māori whakapapa (genealogically-linked) groups. Without such support – as in the 1910s with 
the loss of mana of the Councils set up under the 1900 legislation29 – then the statutory regime 
became ineffectual, marginal or irrelevant in terms of the regional and local conduct of Māori 
politics. Legally the tribal polities might not have been there, but in point of fact their ever-
configuring presence in Māori life remained central. The pattern of tribalised political relations that 
had began so flamboyantly with the Treaty and then atomised into lesser and localised transacting 
necessarily continued. Colonialism may have brought different forms of Māori collective action – or 
"teams", as Andrew Sharp has called them30 – outside (or drawing upon) whakapapa – but the tribe 
remained the core form of customary organisation.31 Whilst the primary agent in the settler-state's 
encounter with and management of the tribes might have eventually become the Māori Land Court, 
that was far from signifying their discontinuance. It signalled the Court's replacement of the Crown 
as the direct agent of state kawanatanga. And the history of the Court's relations with Maori during 
the twentieth century was certainly a highly tribalised one. After the Second World War 
urbanisation of the Māori population away from their tradition tribal regions was much more 
effective in weakening the pull of whakapapa and the fabric of the tribe than all the interfering of 
Pākehā legalism.  
  
for a comparative discussion Toeolesulusulu Salesa "Half-Castes between the Wars: Colonial Categories in 
New Zealand and Samoa" (2000) 34 New Zealand Journal of History 98. 
29  Roger Maaka "Perceptions, conceptions and realities: A Study of the Tribal in Maori Society in the 
Twentieth Century" (PhD thesis, University of Canterbury, 2004) on the loss of mana of the Councils in the 
southern Hawkes Bay region during the 1910s.  
30  Andrew Sharp "Blood, Custom, and Consent: Three Kinds of Maori Groups and the Challenges they 
Present to Governments" (2002) 52 U Tor LJ 9. 
31  Lyndsay Head argues that western colonialism with its state-centred notions of sovereignty lubricated 
changes to Māori political thought and action from a basis in mana (pre- and early-contact) to whakapapa: 
"Land, Authority and the Forgetting of Being in Early Colonial Maori History" (PhD Thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 2006). 
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By the early to mid-1970s, then, a common theme had formed in the common-law jurisdictions 
of North America and Australasia in terms of the legal conceptualisation of their indigenous 
peoples. New Zealand fitted that trend squarely. The position of Māori, as with other indigenous 
peoples, continued to be articulated in racialising terms and their presence in the legal system 
largely characterised negatively through norms of non-discrimination. By that time the national 
legal system had given Māori the right not to be discriminated against in terms of the ways Pakeha 
saw them – as a race. But still it did not validate or authorise their culture and political presence in 
the tribalised way Māori actually organised and saw themselves, except to the extent that particular 
tribes had been able to turn specific statutory mechanisms – the incorporation and the trust board 
especially – to their own ends. That pattern of co-option and adaptive absorption of Pākehā legalism 
into the tribe was no more than patchy. Law still said that Māori would exist as it determined, rather 
than as they actually were. They continued to be seen and treated at law in terms of a simplistic 
conceptual category – race – that was not theirs, not in the Treaty, and never agreed to by them as 
the foundation for constitutional relations or their legal depiction. 
III THE END OF THE RACIALISED PARADIGM 
So when and how did race disappear? When and by what means did the common-law legal 
systems begin seeing tribal societies as they actually saw and organised themselves? The 
governments and agents of at least three jurisdictions – the United States, Canada and New Zealand 
– had a historical pattern of transacting with its aboriginal peoples on the basis of their tribal 
organisation whilst trying, through state law, to deal with them en bloc as a race. When did the legal 
systems stop informing tribal societies that they were as the white man saw and defined them but, 
instead, more as they actually were – a series of tribes, each different and carrying its own history of 
engagement with the Anglo-settler state and other polities (neighbouring tribes, especially) as well 
as its own history of itself as a political being, rather than a monolithic race of individuals afflicted 
by anachronistic tribalism?  
In Morton v Mancari (1974) the United States Supreme Court had to consider the impact of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act 197232 on the employment preference for Indians in the BIA 
(Bureau of Indian Affairs) under the Indian Reorganization Act 1934.33 The 1972 statute proscribed 
discrimination in federal employment practices on the ground of race. The federal policy of 
preferring Indian employees extended back to 1834 and had been renewed by Congress in numerous 
statutes, including most prominently the 1934 Act. The Court noted that the purpose of those 
preferences "as variously expressed in the legislative history" had been "to give Indians a greater 
participation in their own self-government; to further the Government's trust obligation toward the 
  
32  Morton v Mancari (1974) 417 US 535; Equal Employment Opportunity Act 42 USC § 2000 and following. 
33  Indian Reorganization Act 1934 25 USC § 472. 
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Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect 
Indian tribal life."34 The Court held that this was not a case of racial discrimination:35 
Indeed, it is not even a 'racial' preference. Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to 
further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its 
constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the governing agency. 
The Court held that the federal employment preference, as applied, was granted to Indians "not 
as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and 
activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion."36 It was an outcome of the historical and 
ongoing pattern of political relations between the tribes and the federal government.  
The American approach in Morton v Mancari was one that deliberately stepped out of the racial 
paradigm and into a constitutional characterisation more attuned to the history of federal relations 
with the various tribes. It linked recognition of the tribe as a juridical entity to the distinctly 
American doctrine of inherent and residual tribal sovereignty (albeit one subject to the 
Congressional plenary power to legislate). The Supreme Court confirmed that trend in the highly 
important case Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez.37 In this case the doctrine of tribal sovereignty (in 
this case to determine tribal membership) was reinvigorated, leading amongst other things to a 
renaissance of on-reserve tribal courts. Many remain ambivalent about the legacy of Martinez, but it 
certainly affirmed the tribal axis of mainland federal Indian law and relations. Commentators on the 
development of that law under the Rehnquist Court have noted its marked tendency towards 
minimalising the scope of tribal authority whilst at the same time re-averring the foundational 
principle.38 In that respect many commentators have seen the Court's recent position in Rice v 
Cayetano39 as a negative exception (though consistent with the minimalising trend). The Court 
shunned the history of American governmental dealings with the native Hawaiian polity (including 
collusion in its removal in breach of international law) in favour of a racially-oriented 
characterisation of their status.40 The damage done to institutions specifically serving Native 
  
34  Morton v Mancari, above n 32, 541-2 Blackmun J for the Court. 
35  Ibid, 543-4 Blackmun J for the Court. 
36  Ibid, 554 Blackmun J for the Court. 
37  Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, above n 18. 
38  David Getches "Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian 
Law" (1996) 84 Cal L Rev 1573 and David Getches "Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of 
States' rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values" (2001) 86 Minn L Rev 267. 
39  Rice v Cayetano (2000) 528 US 495. 
40  William Spruill "The Fate of the Native Hawaiians: the Special Relationship Doctrine, the Problem of Strict 
Scrutiny, and Other Issues Raised by Rice v Cayetano" (2001) 35 U Rich L Rev 149. 
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Hawaiians may be widespread.41 Thus even whilst the American jurisprudence showed a clear 
principle of tribalised relations, there remained the temptation to go against the clear grain by 
resorting to simplistic ahistorical racialisation. 
Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions, with their rigid notion of singular and indivisible Crown 
sovereignty, have never been able to accept the American doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty. 
However, because these legal systems did not, or rather avowed they could not, recognise the tribe 
as a residual and subordinate sovereign did not mean that the tribe should continue to have no legal 
identity whatsoever inside the Anglo-Commonwealth legal systems. The wilful refusal to accept the 
tribe as a juridical as well as cultural reality that marked the loyalist jurisprudences of the nineteenth 
and much of the twentieth century began to collapse in the 1970s. Implicitly the national common 
law accepted that the tribes were rights-bearing juridical entities. The national courts accomplished 
this without taking an American-like approach and constructing the tribe as a residual sovereign. 
Sovereignty-talk was not needed. The tribe was simply recognised as a juridical entity arising from 
the continued reality of its presence and customary organisation. This step was, of course, consistent 
with the more liberal approach being taken at large by those common-law courts towards 
justiciability and standing. In shedding the exclusionary approach of yore, the loyalist courts moved 
the national jurisprudence out of the racial paradigm into one that tended towards the historical and 
tribalised approach of the American jurisprudence, minus the sovereignty element.  
In all jurisdictions the first breakthrough was a mostly unnoticed procedural one by which courts 
allowed tribal peoples to commence class actions on claims related to tribal interests. That in turn 
allowed the courts to recognise the tribal proprietary right through what became known as the 
common-law doctrine of aboriginal title. This title vested in the tribe whether as a result of their 
factual presence on their lands at the time of Crown sovereignty (the Canadian approach) or as a 
result of their customary legal system operating over that land at the time of Crown sovereignty 
through to the present (the Australian).42 This form of ownership implied the tribal owner had 
juridical identity but in both legal systems the elaboration of that identity has tended in opposite 
directions. In Canada aboriginal title has been linked to self-government – a kind of outward 
expansion from the notion of tribal ownership. That link has been strengthened by the formal 
acknowledgement by the federal Government in 1995 that First Nations had the inherent aboriginal 
right to self-government.43 In Australia, however, the Howard Government doggedly prevented that 
  
41  The case has resulted in other state-established institutions with a specific mandate for Native Hawaiians 
becoming prone: Carroll v Nakatani (2002) 188 F Supp 2d 1233 (D Haw); Arakaki v Lingle (2005) 423 F 
3d 954 (9th Cir); (2006) 126 S Ct 2861; Doe v Kamehameha Schools (2005) 416 F 3d 1025 (9th Cir). 
42  On the different national approaches see McHugh "Aboriginal Title in New Zealand", above n 1. 
43  Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government (Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995) available at www.ainc-inac.gc.ca (accessed 1 September 
2007).  
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enlargement of the proprietary right. It used the native title legislation to constrict the juridical 
compass of tribal ownership to self-management.  
Here one reaches an important difference between the Australian jurisprudence on the one hand 
and the Canadian and New Zealand on the other. In Australia governmental relations with 
Aborigines are constitutionally racialised. Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution was amended as a 
result of a referendum in 1967 following which the following bracketed words were removed.44 The 
Commonwealth took power to make laws for "the people of any race [, other than the Aboriginal 
race in any State,] for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws." 45 This is the basis for 
Commonwealth law, such as the crucial Race Discrimination Act 1975, which prevents states from 
passing laws that discriminate negatively against Aborigines. Because of this wording the case law 
on the scope of section 51(xxvi), which did not begin until the early 1980s, necessarily took and 
keeps a racial orientation.46 That disposition is further complicated by the absence in Australia of a 
history of political relations between the Crown and Aboriginal nations shown by the treaty-making 
patterns of Canada and New Zealand. Indeed, by insisting that Aboriginal tribes, including those 
holding land under a confirmed native title, have no more than a right to self-management, the 
Australian Government has resolutely refused to enter into a similar history of political relations that 
Canada and New Zealand have experienced throughout their national existence.47  
In Canada the jurisprudential foundation for aboriginal and treaty rights in the modern era has 
not been race. There the conduct of comprehensive and specific claims as well as self-government 
negotiations – that is, a governmental practice – as much as court judgment has been premised upon 
the political distinctiveness of each First Nation. Indeed, the federal First Nations Governance Bill 
  
44  Robert Sadler "The Federal Parliament's Power to Make Laws 'With Respect to … the People of any Race'" 
(1985) 10 Syd L Rev 591, 596. 
45  Constitution Alteration (Aborigines) Act 1967 (Cth), repealing s 127 as well as amending s 51(xxvi). 
46  Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (on this 
see McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law, above n 3, 398-400). Later case law dealt with the 
consequences of native title: see 487-9 and Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373; 
Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 152 ALR 540.  
47  In my view, the predicament of Aboriginal peoples in Australia is so dire because they are dealt with almost 
entirely as a matter of race. There is a strong governmental resistance to grasping then building a series of 
relationships with their natural political forms – as through the Indigenous Land Use Agreement 
mechanisms of the native title legislation. The forms of representation that have been statutorily established, 
as with the now abolished ATSIC (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission) and land councils 
under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 have been problematic because of their 
neglect of natural Aboriginal political groupings and alliance. From a nascent history of political relations 
more attuned to the realities of Aboriginal politics there might grow a jurisprudence like that of Canada and 
New Zealand. However that is a prospect from which white Australia seems instinctively to recoil. Further 
see M Langton and L Palmer, "Modern Agreement Making and Indigenous People in Australia: Issues and 
Trends" (2003) 8 AILR 1; M Tehan "A Hope Disillusioned, an Opportunity Lost? Reflections on Common 
Law Native Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act" (2003) 27 Melb U LR 2. 
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proposing a standardised, though interim, governance model for all Nations was expressly rejected 
by the First Nations who refused to be treated on a monolithic, one-size-fits-all basis.48 The rhetoric 
of that rejection had a ring very similar to that surrounding the Runanga Iwi Act 1990 controversy in 
New Zealand a decade before, when Māori also rejected a standardised governance model.  
In 1999, in a case uncannily similar to the contemporaneous New Zealand litigation surrounding 
the fisheries allocation and urban Māori, the Supreme Court considered an agreement between 
Ontario and First Nations bands. By the agreement profits from on-reserve casinos would be used to 
strengthen band economic, cultural and social development administered through a First Nations 
Fund. The appellants (who included the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples) were told (1996) that 
Provincial non-status Indians and Métis were ineligible for the Fund, which was limited to Indian 
Act bands and their status members. At first instance, the Province's exclusion of the appellants was 
ruled an unconstitutional violation of their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter and that 
the Province had acted ultra vires section 91(24). The appellate courts disagreed. The Supreme 
Court explained:49 
The casino project was undertaken by Ontario in order to further develop a partnership or a 
"government-to-government" relationship with Ontario's First Nations band communities. It is a project 
that is aimed at supporting the journey of these aboriginal groups towards empowerment, dignity, and 
self-reliance. While it is not designed to meet similar needs in the appellant aboriginal communities, its 
failure to do so does not amount to discrimination under s 15. 
The Court's reasoning was that this was an agreement about the use of band property (on-reserve 
casinos) rather than a pan-aboriginal settlement for the Province that was worded and administered 
in a discriminatory and unequal manner. The Fund's purview was that of the Indian Act First 
Nations (organised as bands) and its members, and not the broader community of Provincial 
aboriginals. Essentially, the Court characterised the traditional polity as the right-holding body 
rendering (as it were) the consideration for the agreement. The reasoning echoed Morton v Mancari 
by characterizing the relationship being made by the Provincial Crown as one involving a political 
body (or series of them) in partnership rather than a racial group at large. 
In June 2006 the British Columbia Court of Appeal gave judgment in R v Kapp.50 A group of 
non-Aboriginal fishers were charged with illegally fishing at a time when a specific group of 
Aboriginal fishers were permitted to fish under a communal license. The accused argued that the 
federal government licensing policy was discriminatory, race-based and unconstitutional because 
their equality rights had been breached. The Court dismissed the appeal in five separate judgments, 
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concluding that the licensing policy was not discriminatory and that the issuance of the First Nation 
communal fishing licence, designed to increase economic opportunities for Aboriginal peoples, did 
not breach the equality rights of non-Aboriginal commercial fishers. In short, aboriginal and treaty 
rights were not race-based but a response to the special constitutional position of First Nations as 
distinct polities inside Crown sovereignty. 
The juridical foundation in North American jurisdictions for governmental relations with and 
treatment of aboriginal peoples rests on the ongoing history of political relations with customary 
polities. Race has been rejected as the foundation of those relations. 
IV NEW ZEALAND MOVES BEYOND THE RACIAL PARADIGM (1985-) AND 
BUILDS A NEW TRIBALISED AND CONSERVATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF MAORI AFFAIRS 
During the 1980s the New Zealand jurisprudence moved away from the racial paradigm that 
was still was there in the 1970s. How did that happen? This occurred in a number of ways, some but 
not all of which involved the judicial and tribunal elaboration of Treaty principles. The deracination 
and tribalisation of the Māori jurisprudence occurred on several fronts other than by means of the 
statutory recognition of Treaty principles, although that surely oiled the process. 
For a start, whakapapa as manifest in iwi and hapū remained the dominant cultural phenomenon 
surrounding the exercise by the Maori Land Court of its statutory jurisdiction under the old Maori 
Affairs Act 1953. Whilst the Act had been cast in neutral and ostensibly racialised terms, the actual 
operation of its provisions had been highly conditioned by the tribal nature of Māori society. And in 
that regard t'was ever thus. The revision of this legislation in Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 
enabled greater acknowledgement and more facilitative accommodation of the whakapapa nature of 
Māori society in such matters as constitution of trusts and prescription of the preferred class of 
alienees of Māori freehold land. This revision occurred with only the most passing of references to 
the Treaty of Waitangi in the Preamble of the Act, a reference so minor and passing that the 
Principles of the Treaty Principles Deletion Bill with its schedule of offending statutory references 
let it go. 
The common-law doctrine of aboriginal title also had an impact in New Zealand. In Te Weehi v 
Regional Fisheries Officer51 the conviction of a Ngāti Porou man, Tom Te Weehi, under the 
Fisheries Act was quashed on the ground that he was exercising a common-law customary fishing 
right in accordance with tikanga o te Ngai Tahu as spared under section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 
1983. This case was not appealed, a result, some said at the time, of anxiety in government circles of 
Sir Robin Cooke's Court endorsing and extending the judgment along the lines of the American 
  
51  Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 682 (HC). 
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Boldt cases (1974 and 1979).52 Nonetheless, Te Weehi was an important backdrop to the 
commercial sea fisheries settlements of 1989 and 1992.53 It raised the spectre of common-law rights 
in the context of a Court of Appeal then generally perceived (especially in Government) as highly 
sympathetic to Māori claims as evident in the then fresh Maori Council cases. Before the passage of 
the settlement legislation with its provision for taiāpure (customary) fisheries, several cases invoked 
tribal tikanga in applying the section 88(2) exemption of common-law customary fishing rights.54 
After the passage of the legislation there followed twelve years of intense political contestation 
within Maoridom as to the distribution of the income from the fisheries allocation, disputation 
settled (though not, one suspects, permanently) in the Maori Fisheries Act 2004.55 The fisheries 
settlements were concluded in what the modern (that is to say, snail's) pace of claims settlement 
would regard as an unseemly rush.  
The commercial sea fisheries settlement was ostensibly with "Māori" but by the early 1990s any 
depiction of them as a racial bloc was impossible. The Fisheries Allocation saga never entailed, or 
even suggested, definition of Māori as a race. Such a possibility was never in the frame. Rather, it 
was a question of defining their political form. When urban groups, self-identifying as Māori, 
intervened and claimed the right to partake in the settlement, Pākehā courts were called upon to 
determine who the "Māori" were that held the benefit of the settlement. By that time international 
law had moved towards recognition of the right of self-identifying aboriginal individuals and groups 
to have their ethnic status protected positively by the state. The foundation of this right was 
indigenous peoples' ethnicity (self-identifying practices) rather than their race.56 That is to say, 
  
52  United States v Washington (1974) 384 F Supp 312 (WD Wash), affirmed at (1975) 520 F 2d 676 (9th Cir). 
See more recently United States v State of Washington (1998) 157 F 3d 630 (9th Cir) (shellfish). In a highly 
controversial series of judgments, it was held that the right to fish held by tribes of the Pacific North West of 
America under treaty with the federal government entitled them to 50 per cent of the allowable catch. These 
cases were also being talked up before the Waitangi Tribunal: Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report: Wai 22 
(Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1988) paras 9.1.2 and 9.2.5. 
53  Maori Fisheries Act 1989 and Treaty of Waitangi (Sea Fisheries) Settlement Act 1992. For background see 
R Dawson "The Genesis of the New Zealand Parliament's Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement 
Act 1992" (2000) 1 International Journal of Water 80 and Richard Boast "Maori Fisheries 1986-1998: A 
Reflection" (1999) 30 VUWLR 111. See also DV Williams "Customary Rights and Crown Claims: Calder 
and Other Canadian Contributions to the Revival of the Doctrine of Aboriginal Title in Aotearoa New 
Zealand" (a paper prepared for seminar "Let Right Be Done: Calder, Aboriginal Rights and the Treaty 
Process: Looking Forward, Looking Back", University of British Columbia, 2005). 
54  MAF v Love [1988] DCR 370 (DC); MAF v Hakaira & Scott [1989] DCR 289 (DC); Green v MAF [1990] 1 
NZLR 411 (HC); Rawere v MAF (1991) 6 CRNZ 693 (HC); Paku v MAF [1992] 2 NZLR 223 (HC). 
55  See Tāne Waetford "The Māori Fisheries Act 2004: Will it Finally Settle the Māori Fisheries Ssettlement 
Scheme?" (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2006). 
56  I explained the legal basis for this standard in PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North 
America and Australasia" in Ken Coates and PG McHugh (eds) Kokiri Ngatahi: Living Relationships – The 
Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millenium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 107-186. Bizarrely 
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indigenous polities were self-identifying rather than self-identified. Forced to identify the "Māori" 
of the fisheries settlement the courts might have taken that internationalised approach. They might 
have recognised Māori as a dynamic and fluid ethnie comprised primarily of tribes or iwi organised 
by whakapapa (and ramifying into hapū) but with new and still emergent urban groups formed 
around kaupapa (non-genealogical association). This approach was implicit in Sir Robin Cooke's 
comment regarding separate provision for urban Māori in allocation of the benefit of the settlement. 
As this saga unfolded, the courts did not take that approach but the more conservative one. They 
regarded Māori as comprising entirely a bloc of iwi, admittedly with responsibility for their 
urbanised members, but still the same series of political formations that had signed the Treaty of 
Waitangi and entered into historical relations with the Crown.57 Thus the more fluid approach that 
Sir Robin Cooke had signalled – though admittedly no more than raised, much less explored fully in 
the light of those international norms – was rejected.  
This was an historical juncture from which a more elastic notion of Māori political forms might 
have entered the New Zealand legal system. This would have been a difficult and turbulent 
jurisprudence, and doubtless a controversial one. It may well have become a tiger caught by its tail, 
impossible to manage, requiring the juridical characterisation of Māori political fluidity that 
probably defied such analysis with its stagnating, freeze-framing tendencies. When, however, the 
substantive issue of fisheries allocation returned to the courts the moment, like the retired Sir Robin, 
had gone. Such, by then, was the dominance of iwi that a more extended juridical notion of Māori 
collective action extending beyond though dominated by whakapapa did not appear. The definition 
of Māori political being in terms of iwi and whakapapa was certainly a safer, less jurisprudentially 
hazardous course. By taking that route the courts supplemented the historic claims process and 
accentuated the phenomenon some commentators have described as the "re-tribalisation" of Māori 
culture.58 By the late 1990s that re-tribalisation was irreversible and deeply entrenched in New 
Zealand political life and constitutionalism. 
As I have been stressing and as the fisheries settlement and activity of the Maori Land Court 
were showing, the retribalisation of Māori jurisprudence that was becoming evident in the early 
1990s was occurring through legal means other than wholly via statutory references to "the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi". Indeed, until the mid-1980s, there was very little by way of a 
jurisprudence of Māori rights, other than (as I mentioned earlier) one of neglect and inside the 
specialist jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court. In the late 1980s when the New Zealand courts 
  
some commentators misread my description of the standard applied at international law as advocating the 
end of whakapapa. 
57  Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v Te Runanganui o Te Upoko o Te Ika [1996] 3 NZLR 10 (CA); Treaty Tribes 
Coalition v Urban Maori Authorities [1997] 1 NZLR 513 (PC). 
58  Steven Webster "Maori Retribalization and Treaty Rights to the New Zealand Fisheries" (2002) 14 The 
Contemporary Pacific 341; Maaka "Perceptions, conceptions and realities", above n 27. 
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seemed about to embark upon the exercise of giving Māori greater presence in the legal system, 
some thought it might be a question of Treaty rights (as included in statutory regimes) or aboriginal 
rights (emanating from the common law).59 In the end it was a combination of both, although the 
jurisprudence did not become as far-reaching and pervasive as seemed in prospect at that time. And 
it has grown into an essentially conservative form. 
Nonetheless when that Māori jurisprudence started to expand it inevitably reflected the tribal 
character of their society. There is no doubt that Parliamentary willingness to incorporate Treaty 
principles oiled that process considerably. It elevated the importance of the historic claims process 
that began with the extension of the Waitangi Tribunal's jurisdiction in 1985. The interpretation of 
those principles, as set out in section 9 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, by the Court of 
Appeal in the Maori Council cases ensured that claims-resolution would be a national priority rather 
than a quiet diversion of no more than peripheral national attention. And being historic it was plain 
that those claims vested in the historical tribal groups upon whom Crown transgression had been 
visited. That vesting of right meant that the older and more traditional whakapapa forms of Māori 
political representation were renewed and revitalised by the prospect of significant asset restitution. 
Re-tribalisation was augmented considerably by, indeed some might even say it was an outcome of, 
the Treaty settlement processes. In that regard there was an inherently conservative element in the 
dominance that the claims process took in Māori politics and their relations with the state from the 
mid-1980s and especially from the early-mid 1990s when that process began to reach full 
momentum.  
Re-tribalisation could only have led to a conservative jurisprudence. It was conservative in the 
sense that it meant the revalidation – the conservation – of the historical pattern of political relations 
between the Crown and its treaty partners. Claims resolution called for contemporary treaty-making 
with the traditional polities. It was conservative in another sense. The tribe is a political formation of 
human beings in which authority is determined by age and mana. By its very nature that kind of 
polity will be conservative, especially given the strong seam of indigenised Christianity that runs 
through most.60 The claims process has shored up and consolidated the authority of the traditional 
leaders of iwi. 
Further, the claims-settlement processes have required the tribes to organise on a legally more 
secure basis than mere tribalism alone. Customary organisation alone will not suffice in the new era 
of aboriginal asset-management. Before millions of dollars of assets are vested in the claimant tribe 
  
59  Richard Boast "Treaty Rights or Aboriginal Rights?" [1990] NZLJ 32. 
60  On aspects of which see Richard Boast "'In Satan's Time': Missionaries, Land Alienation and Customary 
Law in 19th-century New Zealand" in (1998) Spectrum, stressing that by the mid-nineteenth century many 
had "come to equate pre-Christian customary practice quite literally with the Government of Satan." See 
also John Stenhouse "God's Own Silence: Secular Nationalism, Christianity and the Writing of New 
Zealand History" (2004) 38 New Zealand Journal of History 52. 
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the governments of all North American and Australasian jurisdictions have insisted that legal 
entities are put in place to manage those assets on principles of transparency and accountability 
(political as well as financial). Tribes have been required to keep membership rolls, so that 
customary processes of membership become textualised and re-oriented on a more formal, less fluid 
basis.61 This juridification of the tribe on a basis in which custom plays alongside and is in many 
respects subordinated to new textualised codes necessarily has a conservative impact. It consolidates 
and centralises the authority of those who drive the codes, at the same time overlaying and diluting 
(though it could never oust completely) the authority and dynamism of custom. Textual enclosure, 
even if partial, has an inherently containing and conservative impact upon the group, especially 
those of Māori whose forms of Polynesian political practice historically have shown a high degree 
of adaptability and fluidity.  
One may speculate the future consequences for Māori political forms and practice ensuing from 
the contemporary and ongoing re-accentuation by Māori and the settler state of the rights-bearing 
tribe. This is the setting for a future web of histories, a series of group-based experiences that will 
both shape (as in, indigenise) and be shaped by (as in, reinscribe the colonialism of) national politics 
and constitutionalism. Certainly the current emphasis upon the tribe is channelling – and may even 
be stifling – the political practices of a people whose history shows their receptivity and adaptability 
to new forms of inter-cultural engagement. The paradox is that this quality is being downplayed, if 
not suppressed, in the contemporary Māori jurisprudence and the form of claims-based engagement 
with the settler-state where historical authenticity is given a premium.62 And as I noted earlier, the 
juridical opportunity that Sir Robin provided in the fisheries allocation case was not taken. It is 
impossible now to gauge the wisdom or otherwise of that choice: My point is that it was a safe and 
conservative one that generated a matching jurisprudence. 
The concept of partnership has been identified as a Treaty principle, but it is really a treaty 
principle, in that the concept was implicit in all the treaty and other post-1840 relations between 
Crown and tribe. Partnership, wherever one sourced it, gave the Tribunal and Court of Appeal a 
juridical way to acknowledge the reality of the tribe in a manner sensitive both to the history of 
Crown relations and the demands of the present. It was invoked without recourse to the problematic 
  
61  For instance Linda Waymouth "The Bureaucratisation of Genealogy" (2003) 6 Oceanie available at 
http://recherche.univ-montp3.fr (accessed 1 September 2007).  
62  To comment briefly, this is one of the outcomes of colonialism and the history of Māori engagement with 
western legalism with its reductionist and totalising tendencies, where one customary trait – genealogical 
association (whakapapa) – is set against and put in binary competition with another – political dynamism. In 
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that I have been prepared to leave to others less inside the rights-discourse. My point is the vastly safer one: 
Tribe-based participation in that discourse, which now is a fact of Māori life, has had an inherently 
conservative impact upon their political practices inter se. 
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language of sovereignty. The formulation of Treaty principles in these fora, notably the Crown's 
duty of "active protection", acknowledged that this was an asymmetrical partnership; however the 
Tribunal and courts were insistent that this was also one in which dialogue was important. The 
outcome of the first so-called Lands case itself indicated that. The Court of Appeal instructed the 
parties to negotiate an interim arrangement to allow both corporatisation of state assets and their 
availability for the eventual settlement of historic claims. In the event of agreement not being 
reached, the Court reserved the right to impose its own arrangement. In the event that proved 
unnecessary.63 With these modern agreements – the Lands and fisheries settlements – there 
resumed between the Crown and iwi the historical pattern of direct political relations. This now 
overlaid, and in many respects over-shadowed, the more low-key and more specialised 
accommodation of tribal identity inside the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court. 
 
That pattern of political relations also arose from the historic claims process, the integrity of 
which the Maori Council cases had sought to ensure. Indeed that pattern was resuming even whilst 
claimants were presenting historic claims to the Tribunal under its recently-widened jurisdiction. 
The late Sir Robert Mahuta astutely decided to bypass the Tribunal process altogether and 
commenced direct negotiations with the Crown on the Tainui confederation's raupatu (confiscation) 
claim.64 Tainui reached settlement in 1995, three years before the first major historic claim, the 
huge Ngai Tahu claim, was settled in 1998. Yet claimants equipped with a Tribunal Report on their 
historic claims have always had to enter into direct negotiation with the Crown given that the Report 
issued "recommendations". The Tribunal has been reluctant to enter into a remedies jurisprudence 
forcing the hand and pace of settlement negotiations – although there has emerged the makings of 
one65 – seeing these negotiations as a matter of partnership. This is an arms-length posture taken 
also by the courts. Nonetheless the historic claims settlement process represents a mechanism by 
which claimant iwi and hapū enter into direct dialogue and agreement with the Crown. They do so 
not as "Māori", a racial group, but as members of a political entity that has suffered in its historical 
treatment by the Crown. 
There has been another important site of that engagement and that has been under the tangata 
whenua provisions of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). These provisions were squarely 
 
63  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA). The eventual negotiated 
agreement with its "claw-back" provisions was legislated as the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 
988. 
64  Part of Sir Robert's strategy included the bringing of myself and Benedict Kingsbury, both of us junior 
academics in Cambridge and Oxford respectively, to New Zealand in 1989 for a series of presentations on 
the emergent jurisprudence of aboriginal rights at common law (myself) and international law (Benedict). 
Sir Robert sensed the Government was nervous about the direction the law might take, and told us that he 
wanted to fuel and use that anxiety as leverage to move into direct negotiation.  
65  See Waitangi Tribunal Te Whanganui-a-Orotu Report: Wai 55 (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1998) and 
Turangi Township Remedies Report: Wai 84 (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1998). 
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in the firing line of the Treaty Principles Deletion Bill. Certainly the early experience of the tangata 
whenua provisions was bumpy and a considerable body of case-law developed on the "who", "what" 
and "how" of consultation with iwi. However after an early flurry that activity had settled down with 
the case-law providing substantial guidance on how iwi fitted into the RMA scheme, especially with 
regard to their involvement in applications for resource consent.66 Further, recent studies by the Te 
Puni Kōkiri (TPK) have found that the consultation procedure was not necessarily a substantial drag 
where local authorities had built and maintained good relationships with local iwi. The real problem 
that TPK uncovered in relation to the statutory involvement of iwi in the RMA processes was not 
the "unreasonable" invocation of Treaty principles to block planning and resource consents, as 
sensationalist media attention to taniwha (sea and river monsters) seemed to suggest. The studies 
showed that Māori values were not necessarily incompatible with resource development.67 Rather 
the problem was one of the capacity and capability of iwi to participate meaningfully and 
cooperatively in the process.68 In that regard the picture was a patchy and regionalised one. The 
problem was not Māori participation so much as their inability to do so effectively. If one were to 
implicate the Treaty principles in that result, it would be to see it as an expression of their failure 
rather than their invocation. If the Treaty principle of partnership were operating properly, then the 
iwi consultation requirements would not be problematic. The 2005 amendment to the RMA 
removing the requirement of iwi consultation for resource consent applications and limiting it to the 
broader policy-setting levels of Policy Statement, and formation of District and Local Plans has in 
any event taken any steam there was out of this area. The deeper problem of iwi capacity and 
capability remains. And again, looking at the profile of the RMA jurisprudence one is struck by its 
inherent conservatism. The issues have been less the disruptive impact of Māori spiritualism than 
the process-related questions of enabling Māori to play a meaningful role. This has not been a 
radical or activist jurisprudence but one where issues of process rather than principle have pressed 
hardest. 
In addition, one feature of the engagement of claims resolution processes with resource 
management issues has been the use of co-management regimes to give aboriginal peoples ongoing 
participation and voice in matters that often bear closest upon their identity and association with 
traditional land. These regimes have been used in North America and to some extent in Australia, 
  
66  I discuss that case law in "Living with Rights Aboriginally: Constitutionalism and Maori in the 1990s" in 
Michael Belgrave, Mereta Kawharu and David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited – Perspectives on the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2004) 283. 
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Resource Management Act 1991 (Te Puni Kōkiri, Wellington, 2006). I am grateful to Arnu Turvey who 
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although, so far as one can generalise, their experience and success have been patchy. Co-
management can be pitched at a series of levels ranging from rights to be consulted (lower level) 
through to rights of co-decision (upper level). In New Zealand co-management has not been 
formally recognised as one of the options available in settlement packages, although there have been 
some arrangements that resemble a form of it.69 It may become a device that finds more widespread 
use, but if that happens, the responsible Māori group will surely be the traditional territorial iwi.  
By now my belief will be plain. To the extent there has grown a jurisprudence of Treaty 
principles it has been an inherently conservative one. Far from pushing the boundaries of that 
jurisprudence the courts have been cautious and more concerned with ensuring due process. The 
profile of the jurisprudence has been facilitative, geared mostly around getting the relevant parties in 
constructive dialogue within the terms of the statutory regime. The courts have not engaged in some 
fanciful fluffing-up of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Certainly the jurisprudence has for 
the most part become low-key and below the public sightline. The description of it in the Bill before 
Parliament as "increasingly" activist was plainly wrong. One cannot pretend there have not been 
problems, but very few of those originated directly from the statutory application of Treaty 
principles. 
Here one might pause and comment that the most important manifestation of those political 
relations – the historic claims settlement process – is non-statutory. Though the Waitangi Tribunal 
operates under a statutory mandate the actual post-Tribunal mechanism for resolution of validated 
historical claims does not have a legal foundation. Further, it might be noted that the courts have 
resolutely refused to intervene in those settlement processes on administrative law grounds. 
Likewise the RMA structure has been resistant to the injection of administrative law principles.70 
Some have seen that cautious, arms-length approach as reviving the "political question" doctrine of 
non-justiciability associated with the Parata case.71 In other words, the reasoning runs, there may 
have been a renewal of political relations between Crown and iwi but those remain exactly that – 
political dealings inhabiting an extra-legal zone. 
However, there are important differences from a century ago, particularly if one considers 
contemporary relations in the light of the claims-settlement process. First, whilst the courts have 
indicated their willingness to intervene to ensure the inherent fairness of the settlement process and 
to see that all claimants obtain the Crown's ear, generally they have seen the principle of partnership 
  
69  See Arnu Turvey Rights Integration – Co-management Regimes and Resource Management (LLM 
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as leaving the conduct of the process to the parties themselves. The fact that this process is not set 
out by law does not mean that it is inherently unstable and irregular. Indeed the experience of 
claimant groups in this new century seems to be the opposite – that it is grindingly and relentlessly 
regular in its operation. The crucial difference between now and the then of the Parata case is that 
there is no juridical obliteration of the tribe. Unlike Prendergast CJ's insistence that the tribes are not 
there, the foundation of the new "political question" doctrine is the acceptance that they very much 
are – the invisible tribe no longer. The principle of non-justiciability does not mean an absence of 
public law consequence. Rather, it means the courts will not be the sole or primary agent of that 
consequence in the claims-settlement arena. Crown-tribe relations occur inside a sphere governed by 
extra-statutory procedure (as set out in the Office of Treaty Settlement's "red book" of settlement 
procedure) and tikanga in which the constitutional actors themselves, Crown and iwi, maintain their 
historical interaction and apply a unique internalised legalism.72 Call this government-to-
government, nation-to-nation, or partner-to-partner relations, but the reawakening and pursuit of 
those relations has become in the past twenty years the embedded "realism" of New Zealand's 
constitutional arrangements, constructed as they are through a myriad of hard and soft laws of which 
"Treaty principles" are but a segment (though an important one). The constitution is not solely a 
matter of what the courts are doing. It constitutes itself more fundamentally through the relevant 
actors conducting themselves on a regularised basis and in a manner they regard as obligatory (even 
if large elements are characterised by courts as non-justiciable). 
It is my view that the major failing of Treaty principles has not been that in the articulation they 
have been racially divisive as the sponsor of the Treaty Principles Deletion Bill insisted. Rather the 
problem has been that their implementation has not been thorough. Māori lost an important 
opportunity when their representatives rejected inclusion of a Treaty principles clause in the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (BORA). This would have given those principles a clear application throughout the 
public sector. As it was, in the wake of the Maori Council cases, numerous governmental bodies 
audited their performance in terms of the principles articulated by the courts and embodied in the 
Crown Principles for Action (1989, revised 2000).73 As a result Treaty-compliant practices or at 
least Treaty-audit mechanisms began to permeate the administrative practices of the public sector. 
This was less a result of the actual court decisions, which affected the state enterprises segment of 
the public sector, than the outcome of the spectre that the cases seemed to be raising and which the 
government acknowledged in articulating its Principles for Crown Action. There was a belief that an 
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intense process of law-formation was about to occur, led by the courts, and that the public sector 
needed to be ready. There was a sense that this responsiveness to Treaty principles was likely to 
become a legal necessity, but there was also a perception of the constitutional tenor of the Maori 
Council cases. The cases were put in a constitutional light and, so located, became the foundation 
for an adjustment of institutional behaviour. Again, the constitutional actors moved without being 
required to do so by the courts. It was a perceptual matter that was acted upon and in so doing 
carried constitutional consequence. In that sense the Court of Appeal's judgments were at least 
partially (if not wholly) responsible for awakening those soft law practices and revision of 
institutional process.  
The Maori Council cases were as remarkable, then, for the widespread revision of institutional 
practices that they initiated and which the Crown Principles anointed, as in their actual holdings. 
Again, it was a case of constitutional actors perceiving an obligation and adjusting their behaviour 
in the light of it.  
As it was, that spectre of active judicial formation of a comprehensive Treaty jurisprudence did 
not materialise. The radical extension of Treaty principles by the courts that some were auguring in 
the Cooke years74 did not materialise. Still, the incomplete reach of Treaty principles meant that 
many public bodies that had responded positively to them remained in the dark as to whether this 
was obliged at law. A Treaty principles clause in the BORA would have confirmed their sense that 
the constitutional renewal spoken of by the Court of Appeal was also required at law. The reason 
why the courts did not extend the reach of Treaty principles mainly lay in the nature of the cases 
coming before them which is, of course, how judges develop and amplify the common law. Most of 
the litigation arose in areas that did not invite the courts to embark upon such activity even had they 
been minded to do so, notably those identified earlier (being the historic claims and fisheries 
settlement processes).  
As I have been stressing, the profile of the Māori jurisprudence in the 1990s and 2000s has been 
mostly conservative. It has largely occurred in particular self-contained areas where its capacity to 
infiltrate the wider sphere has been limited. For the most part it has been happening well below the 
public sightline. And as this has happened it has become not only an inherently conservative but 
also an embedded jurisprudence. Given what it has accomplished and continues to achieve one 
wonders why on earth anyone would want to discontinue it or at least sever one of its important 
limbs? 
There has been one exception, if that it be, to the conservative pattern of the court-led 
jurisprudence and that was Ngati Apa v Attorney General,75 the foreshore and seabed case. 
However, this was not a Treaty principles case but one regarding the statutory jurisdiction of the 
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Maori Land Court and common-law aboriginal title. The reaction that it sparked confirmed the 
extent to which the jurisprudence of Māori affairs had become a conservative if not complacent 
legalism inside several "pots" that bubbled away below the public sightline: historic and fisheries 
settlements, the RMA litigation and ongoing operation of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
The foreshore and seabed experience was not a happy one but one of its lessons entailed the 
realisation that the jurisprudence had become settled and was operating on the basis of a known set 
of rights, advancing and consolidating those. The Ngati Apa judgments suggested there might be a 
set of new Māori rights previously unrecognised at law (although awareness of the possibility of 
unextinguished rights around the coastline had been in circulation for years).76 The case came at a 
time when certainly the executive branch believed that all those rights had been substantially 
provided for and were being accommodated inside those pots. The new rights – or rather the spectre 
of new rights – rocked what was until then a complacent jurisprudence. The displacement caused by 
the foreshore and seabed controversy underlined the character of the Māori jurisprudence, taking it 
back to a more turbulent time when the key rights were more inchoate and hence uncontained. 
What would happen, then, if Parliament were to delete the recognition of Treaty principles from 
the range of statutes in which they are included? Since those principles are a big segment of a 
jurisprudence that has been both conservative and embedded, it is my belief that the courts would 
feel obliged to fill the vacuum their removal would leave. Instead of a legalism that is contained and 
bounded by the words and compass of a statutory regime I believe courts would resort to common-
law devices to put something resembling the old principles in place. Certainly the foundation is 
there: the courts have been low-profile in this sphere precisely because the partners are getting on 
with the business of conducting their political relations mostly below the public sightline in 
specialised fora with their own legalism and kawa (Māori protocol). At present those relations may 
be happening in a less than perfect manner but not to an extent that the courts have charged in and 
generated a radical Treaty jurisprudence or forced the hand and pace of claims resolution processes. 
All that might change if the statutory basis for Treaty principles were taken away.  
For instance, remove Treaty principles and the courts might then invoke the notion of Crown 
fiduciary duty to its aboriginal peoples. This is a common-law concept that New Zealand courts so 
far have eschewed applying to Crown-tribe relations despite suggestive dicta from the Court of 
Appeal in the Maori Council cases. It is now well-developed in Canadian jurisprudence.77 In New 
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Zealand the doctrine’s key predicate of an asymmetrical constitutional relation between Crown and 
particular tribal nations is even more applicable in that there is no overriding constitutional 
protection of Māori rights matching section 35 of The Canada Act. They might well revisit that 
reluctance and use it as a basis for doctrinal development. Similarly some of the tools of 
administrative law such as legitimate expectation and mandatory relevant considerations might also 
be used more imaginatively to fill the gaps arising from the disappearance. Of course, one cannot 
speculate where or how that would happen, but the point is that the removal of a conservative and 
embedded jurisprudence would invite the courts to build their own version. Thus the statutory 
deletion of Treaty principles would invite rather than eliminate the very judicial "activism" that the 
Bill's author so evidently and so strongly dislikes. It is a political gesture of the most bizarre and 
uninformed type. It would set government and court in false contest. 
In thinking of that potential disjuncture between constitutional law and fact there are these these 
prescient words of Sir John Salmond:78 
Although the constitution de jure and the constitution de facto are not necessarily the same, they 
nevertheless tend towards coincidence. Constitutional law and practice react upon each other, each 
striving to assimilate the other to itself. The objective facts of state organisation tend to mould legal 
theory into conformity with themselves. They seek expression and recognition through legislation, or 
through the law-creating functions of the courts. Conversely, the accepted legal theory endeavours to 
realise itself in the facts. The law, although it necessarily involves a pre-existing constitution, may 
nevertheless react upon and influence the constitution from which it springs. … The will of the body 
politic, as expressed through the legislature and the courts, will commonly realise itself in constitutional 
fact no less than in constitutional theory.  
Sir John Salmond's suggestion that somehow constitutional law will converge with 
constitutional fact seems applicable here. The conservative jurisprudence of Māori affairs has not 
only become embedded but it is an embedding one, spreading deep roots through our institutions of 
governance. It has entailed the adoption and maintenance of processes in the practices of the public 
sector that in the past two decades have become longstanding, habituated and habitual. In that sense 
the constitutional and institutional adjustments that the Maori Council cases initiated have become 
irreversible. At present our constitutional law largely meshes with those facts. But undo that law and 
somehow, as Salmond suggested, a reconvergence will occur. Judges will see the onus as theirs 
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through "the law-creating functions of the courts". They will feel pressed to bring constitutional law 
into a sort of harmony with constitutional practice, acting on the imperative recognised by Salmond. 
As the Treaty Principles Deletion Bill has died in the water that judicial activism is no more than 
a projection of an unlikely situation. But it has given the opportunity to see the Māori jurisprudence 
for what it has become: highly tribalised, conservative, embedded, consolidating, and a 
constitutional phenomenon primarily driven by the actors themselves with the courts, for all the 
flamboyance with which Māori have recourse to them and seek to deploy their mana, playing 
cautious touch judge. The jurisprudence is not founded on race, but on recognition and maintenance 
of a pattern of political relations with tribal polities (whose stock has been revitalised by the historic 
claims processes). This jurisprudence has ballooned in the twenty-five years since I entered the field 
at a time when conception of aboriginal rights was the discourse primarily of a group of academics 
whose mission was to persuade the courts to take the lead and articulate a set of rights. Whether 
because of, or, more likely, despite that encouragement, the courts were instrumental in bringing 
aboriginal nations into the rights-place. In North America and Australasia the courts instigated the 
new rights-era for tribes. In New Zealand the judgments of the Court of Appeal presided by Sir 
Robin Cooke in the Maori Council cases were instrumental in ensuring and enhancing the historic 
claims processes. Yet those cases had wider-ranging consequences, the perception of an "activist" 
court prompting Crown acknowledgment of Māori rights in other spheres – such as fisheries and 
bureaucratic practices – where strictly there was then no legal compulsion. In accomplishing this 
change, the Maori Council cases are undoubted landmarks in New Zealand constitutional history 
embodying the intellectual leadership of Sir Robin Cooke.  
Even though the jurisprudence that followed the Maori Council cases has been conservative in 
tone that very quality is not necessarily a vice. Living with rights has brought new challenges for 
Māori within the legitimating compass of a constitutional system that now acknowledges their 
presence as a series of whakapapa-based polities. Rights are not a result. Living with them, and what 
they secure, represents an ongoing process for the rights-holders more problematic than the simple 
black and white scenario of denial. The nature of those rights, and the realisation of their potential, 
is inherently piecemeal. Some see their scope as inadequate and regard the process of resolution as 
deeply flawed. For iwi and hapū, as the present activity of the Law Commission signifies, the tasks 
of rights-management (governance) and -integration are not easy, whether it be constructing the 
mode for those tasks (pre-settlement) or actually driving them (post-settlement or in contexts such 
as RMA participation). This rights-centred activity has become the new reality for Māori groups, 
and if one is to talk of a Māori jurisprudence or the legalism spawned by Treaty principles it should 
be in terms of these contemporary challenges before iwi and hapū. These, after all, are human 
formations united by kin in which a wide range of views and dispositions will naturally occur.  
Whilst deeply felt by Māori and intensely debated amongst themselves, those processes of tribal 
rights-management and -integration have largely been hidden from Pākehā eyes. The challenge for 
the New Zealand constitutional system is to facilitate that activity, not to obliterate it. Instead, 
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certain politicians have depicted a highly variegated and tribalised legalism as a simple matter of 
race-based preference and as a gravy train in which Treaty principles are to blame. Race has nothing 
to do with the complex set of rights held by Māori other than in the proscription of discrimination 
on grounds of race (or, for that matter, sex, religion, age or sexual orientation) affecting all New 
Zealanders. Race is a simplistic and Eurocentric way of seeing the world. In describing Māori issues 
and experience in racialised terms politicians are saying that world is the way they see and deem it 
to be. It is an act of arrogance. It is mischievous, reductionist and oblivious to the constitutional 
basis of Crown relations with the tribes. It is also old hat; those relations are located inside a 
conservative juridical sphere that has long since moved beyond facile racist characterisation. 
 
